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This paper studies ethnic discrimination in Germany’s labour market with a correspondence 
test. To each of 528 advertisements for student internships we send two similar applications, 
one with a Turkish-sounding and one with a German-sounding name. A German name raises 
the average probability of a callback by about 14 percent. Differential treatment is particularly 
strong and significant at smaller firms at which the applicant with the German name receives 
24 percent more callbacks. Discrimination disappears when we restrict our sample to 
applications including reference letters which contain favourable information about the 
candidate’s personality. We interpret this finding as evidence for statistical discrimination. 
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Discrimination against individuals with respect to ethnicity, gender, or religion has
a wide impact on labour market outcomes, including job opportunities, promotions
and earnings. The extent to which a society is plagued by discrimination is hard
to measure, however. On the one hand, empirical studies based on ﬁeld data can
deliver measures for earnings inequality but they cannot unveil discriminatory prac-
tices in the hiring process, for example. Moreover, ﬁeld data are not collected in a
controlled environment, so that the researcher has typically much less information
about worker characteristics than is available to the employing ﬁrm. Hence it is
diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀects of actual productivity diﬀerences from employer
discrimination. On the other hand, laboratory experiments on discrimination can
be conducted in fully controlled settings. What is measured there, however, is the
behaviour of subjects in a sterile environment; how far the ﬁndings of such ex-
periments extend to employer–worker interactions in real–world labour markets is
unclear. Field experiments are a compromise between these approaches, combin-
ing the advantages of controlled experiments with a ﬁeld context.1 With regard to
measuring hiring discrimination, the correspondence test method is a sensible way
to measure the initial response of employers to varying characteristics of artiﬁcial
applicants.
This paper describes a correspondence test conducted in the German labour market
for student internships. We examine the hiring opportunities of individuals with
a Turkish migration background. Germany has about 2.4 million persons with a
Turkish ethnic background (2.9 percent of its population). Predominantly in the
1960s, migrants from Turkey came to Germany to enlarge its labour force. About
forty years later, the children and grand–children of these workers, born and raised
in Germany, represent a signiﬁcant share of Germany’s workforce. Among other
things, a full integration of these young women and men into the German labour
market necessitates equal employment opportunities.
Our experiment generates a snapshot of ethnic discrimination in one particular sub-
section of the labour market. In particular, we send more than one thousand ap-
plications to ﬁrms that oﬀer internships for students of economics and management
1See Harrison and List (2004) for a survey on ﬁeld experiments.
2science. In practice such internships serve as an important prerequisites for access
into regular jobs. Although they are not well paid, a student who has success-
fully completed an internship gains job experience and signiﬁcantly improves his
employment opportunities after graduation. Today, the completion of at least one
internship is commonly expected and is often considered as a “foot in the door”.
To each of 528 job advertisements, we send two similar applications, one with a
Turkish sounding name (“Fatih Yildiz” or “Serkan Sezer”) and one with a typical
German name (“Dennis Langer” or “Tobias Hartmann”). Importantly, the name is
the only distinguishing characteristic of the applicant with Turkish ethnical back-
ground. That is, all applicants have German citizenship and they were born and
educated in Germany, and all of them specify “German” as their mother tongue.
With that design, we are able to isolate the eﬀect of ethnicity from possible language
eﬀects. We create two slightly diﬀerent types of applications with similar grades,
soft skills, and photographs. For every job vancancy, applicant names are randomly
assigned to the two diﬀerent applications. Furthermore, the amount of information
provided by the students varies between the two diﬀerent applications. In particular,
one application type contains reference letters stating favourable information about
the candidate’s personality traits such as conscientiousness and agreeableness. We
use this variation to explore the eﬀect of statistical discrimination versus taste–based
discrimination.
The ﬁeld experiment shows that an application with a German–sounding name is on
average 14% more likely to receive a callback. Discrimination is more pronounced
among smaller ﬁrms: ﬁrms with less than 50 employees give “Dennis” and “Tobias”
about 24% more callbacks than “Fatih” and “Serkan”. We also ﬁnd evidence that
a reasonable fraction of the diﬀerential treatment can be attributed to statistical
discrimination: while there is almost no diﬀerence in callback probabilities for the
application that is equipped with personality information (37.4% with a German
name vs. 36.9% with a Turkish name), the absence of such information in the other
application gives rise to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in callback probabilities (41.8% with
a German and 32.5% with a Turkish name).
Our results can be compared with those from other ﬁeld studies that explore eth-
nic discrimination in other countries.2 Across these studies, the measured degree
2There are several ﬁeld studies that test discrimination against other characteristics, e.g. Neu-
3of diﬀerential treatment varies remarkably with the respective context. In the
U.S. labour market, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) show that applications with
White–sounding names receive 50% more callbacks for interviews than those with
African–American–sounding names. They ﬁnd that the racial gap is uniform across
occupation, industry, and employer size. A similarly huge diﬀerence in callback
rates is documented by Drydakis and Vlassis (2007) who analyze the labour market
opportunities of Albanians in Greece. They ﬁnd that Albanians not only face a 43%
smaller chance of access to occupations, but they are also signiﬁcantly less likely to
be registered with insurance coverage. For Arabs in Sweden, Carlsson and Rooth
(2007) ﬁnd that every fourth employer discriminates against the minority. Wood et
al. (2009) conduct a correspondence test in Britain, ﬁnding that there are consider-
able gaps in callbacks between whites and several diﬀerent ethnical groups. For the
German labour market, Goldberg et al. (1996) conducted various ﬁeld experiments
to analyze ethnic discrimination of migrants, also ﬁnding substantial diﬀerences in
callback rates. However, the legal framework has changed since 1994 when their
experiments were conducted. Further, Goldberg et al. analyze the situation of mi-
grants, that is, workers that were born in Turkey and with Turkish mother tongue,
whereas we focus on German citizens with a Turkish migrational background.
Compared to these other studies, the extent of discrimination in our experiment
is comparatively small. There are at least two explanations for this phenomenon.
First, our applications contain much more information than those in the studies
cited above. In particular, in Germany it is common practice to submit not only
a resume, but also copies of all school and university certiﬁcates; these certiﬁcates
provide detailed hard–evidence information about various skills. Second, we focus on
a high–skill segment of the labour market; it is unclear whether ethnic discrimination
in Germany is stronger in other segments of the labour market.3 The rest of this
mark (1996), Goldin and Rouse (2000)) and Petit (2007) for gender, Banerjee et al. (2009) for
caste and religious groups in India, Rooth (2007) for obesity and Weichselbaumer (2003) for sexual
orientation.
3Carlsson and Rooth (2007) ﬁnd large diﬀerences across occupations, with diﬀerences in call-
back rates varying from 10 percent (computer professionals) to over 100 percent (shop sales and
cleaning). But even in their study, there are several high–skill segments of the labour market with
much higher discrimination rates than in our study. Large callback diﬀerences across occupations
are also observed by Wood et al. (2009).
4paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and
Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
The Vacancies
The experiment focuses on a speciﬁc segment of the labour market, in particular the
market for internships for students in economics and business. This restriction allows
us to completely automate the application process by sending serial letters and to
eliminate potential bias caused by individually written and adjusted applications.
We also restrict our study to internships within Germany.
We only apply for internships with a duration ranging from 6 weeks to 6 months
and consider all reasonable vacancies posted at large internet job sites (such as mon-
ster.de and jobscout24.de). The ﬁeld experiment was conducted in two waves, the
ﬁrst one covering vacancies posted in December 2007 and January 2008, the second
one considering positions posted in December 2008. Although all ﬁrms explicitly
search for students in economics or business programmes, the internships are quite
heterogeneous. This concerns employer characteristics (size, sector, location), the
division within the ﬁrm (typically human resources, marketing, ﬁnance or control-
ling). Most of the vacancies are at ﬁrms with 500 or more employees. Large ﬁrms
and banks are the most relevant employers for graduates of economics and business,
and they are more likely to post their vacancies on large internet job sites. Further,
there are only few vacancies from East Germany since most large corporations have
their headquarters in West Germany.
Applications
All applicants are second–year students of age 21 or 22. Our applications are quite
comprehensive compared to other ﬁeld studies on hiring discrimination. In par-
ticular, each application contains a cover letter, a curriculum vitae, a high–school
certiﬁcate and a certiﬁcate documenting university grades in the ﬁrst year. In the
German labour market, this amount of information is necessary to achieve a rea-
sonable callback rate. In fact, most employers explicitly request copies of all these
certiﬁcates. Omitting them would bias our results signiﬁcantly since only quite
5unattractive employers would respond to an application that contains only a re-
sume.
We create two slightly diﬀerent types of resumes, labeled type A and type B, such
that we can send two application to each ﬁrm.4 Students of both types were born,
raised and educated in West Germany, but in diﬀerent regions, one in the state of
North Rhine–Westphalia, the other one in Baden–Wuerttemberg. After graduating
from school, both skip military service, work at a summer job and then attend
diﬀerent universities. Both aim at a bachelor’s degree in business economics. At the
time of the application they are in their third semester and they are applying for
an internship during their fourth semester. The school and university certiﬁcates
document grades between “good” and “very good”, so that the students range in
the top 25 percent of their peer groups.
Both types are ﬂuent in English and they have basic knowledge of one further
foreign language. Since applications are identical for applicants with a Turkish and
a German name, the applicant with the Turkish name is a native German speaker
and he also does not report any command of Turkish in his CV. Both types have
reasonably developed computer skills. Moreover, both applicants state in there CV
that they had two minor part–time jobs, but while type B provides two letters
of reference from previous employers, type A does not add any related documents.
The two reference letters contain positive statements about the student’s personality
(aﬀability, commitment, capacity for teamwork, conscientiousness). This variation
in information is used to analyze the eﬀects of statistical discrimination. In all other
dimensions, applications of types A and B are rather similar; particularly, there
are only minor deviations in individual school and university grades. Hence, the
variation in information about personality is the decisive informational diﬀerence
between these types.
Finally, all applications are completed by a type–speciﬁc photograph. While in
many countries ﬁrms do not request or even oppose photographs in applications,
they are still very common (and sometimes requested) in Germany. Omitting them
would again bias the results. We select photographs that ﬁt both a native German
student as well as one with a Turkish migration background. Each resume type has
its own unique photograph, while names are randomly assigned to the types. This
4Detailed CVs of both types are available upon request.
6guarantees that the choice of the photograph has no overall eﬀect on the callback
rates of an individual name.
We systematically adjust certain details in the cover letter of every single application
to match job–speciﬁc features relating to the sector of the ﬁrm or the division of the
internship. This adjustment is performed automatically using serial letters. That
is, we design for each type and each division a speciﬁc paragraph matching the
basic requirements and interest for that division. For example, when applying for
an internship in the human resource division, an applicant of type A would explain
why he is interested in human resource management and he also states that he
intends to pursue a master’s degree in human resource management after ﬁnishing
his bachelor degree. Our approach to standardize serial letters reﬂects the trade–oﬀ
between maximizing the callback rate by adjusting the application to the speciﬁc
requirements of each post and generating unbiased letters (and also reducing our
workload).
The Names
The ﬁrst application that is supposed to be sent to each individual ﬁrm is randomly
assigned a type (A or B) and a name (German or Turkish), while the second ap-
plication then is assigned the complementary type and name.5 We choose “Dennis
Langer” (ﬁrst wave) and “Tobias Hartmann” (second wave) as names for the na-
tive German candidate. The ﬁrst names as well as the surnames belong to the 30
most common ones for the birth years 1986 to 1988 in Germany. The name of the
applicant from the ethnic minority is “Fatih Yildiz” in the ﬁrst wave and “Serkan
Sezer” in the second one. Both, ﬁrst names and surnames, are common for male
descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany. It is also evident for every human
resource manager to deduce the ethnic background from these names. We did not
explicitly check for connotations of names regarding their social background, but
we assured that the names do not contradict common sense, are very stereotype
or exhibit other peculiarities (e.g. ruling out combinations between an Anatolian
ﬁrst name and a Kurdish surname). We also made sure that none of these names
corresponds to a real person in Germany’s student web network (studivz.de).
5In particular, we simulate an urn model to determine the type and name of the application
that is sent ﬁrst. All four possible combinations of types and names are used equally often.
7The application process
We create an individual e-mail address for each name and prepare mobile phones
with name–speciﬁc numbers. However, we do not answer incoming calls directly,
but ﬁrms are redirected to the voice mail where they are politely asked to leave
their names and contact information. Additionally, we made arrangements such
that answers by regular mail to both candidates and addresses were redirected to
us. Thus ﬁrms could contact the applicants via mail, e-mail and phone.
When applying, all documents (cover letters, CVs, additional documents such as
certiﬁcates) are automatically merged to one single pdf ﬁle and are e-mailed to the
ﬁrm. After sending the ﬁrst application we waited two days before sending the
second one. A reasonable fraction of ﬁrms (especially larger ones that expect to
receive many applications) do not accept applications by e-mail, but instead require
the applicants to complete several pre–deﬁned online forms. In these cases, the
forms are ﬁlled out with the respective applicant’s information and our documents
were attached as pdf ﬁles whenever possible.
After applying for the vacancy we registered callbacks in the subsequent four months.
A callback is deﬁned as any action of a ﬁrm that signals interest in the respective
resume, including oﬀers for interviews, direct job oﬀers and leaving contact infor-
mation on the voice mail. In contrast, automatic responses conﬁrming the receipt
of our applications are not considered as callbacks, as well as written requests for
additional information which were answered whenever possible. For every reaction
of a ﬁrm, be it a callback, rejecting the applicant, or a request for more information,
we collect the date and the type of reaction. Within 24 hours of that reaction, we
politely withdraw the candidate’s further interest in the position.
3 Results
The application process at each of the 528 ﬁrms can have several outcomes, sum-
marized in Table 1. Either the ﬁrm shows no positive reaction towards any of the
candidates (column 1), or at least one applicant receives a callback (column 2). In
the latter case, either both receive a callback (column 3), or the ﬁrm prefers one
of the students, either the one with the German (column 4) or with the Turkish
name (column 5). Column (6) calculates net discrimination as the diﬀerence in call-
8backs between applications with a German and with a Turkish name, expressed as
a percentage of those observations where at least one candidate received a callback.
This deﬁnition of net discrimination treats those cases where no candidate receives
a callback as a non–observation. Riach and Rich (2002) discuss whether a negative
answer (or no answer at all) for both candidates should be considered as equal treat-
ment or as a non–observation. On the one hand, if a ﬁrm rejects both applicants
(or does not even send an answer) this could be considered equal treatment; that
is, somebody reviewed both applications and found them not suitable for the job.
On the other hand, it is also conceivable that the ﬁrm was not even considering the
applications, for instance because the vacancy has already been ﬁlled.
We conduct a standard χ2 test of the hypothesis that the two possible outcomes of
unequal treatment (that is, columns (4) and (5)) are equally likely.6 If the applica-
tion with the German name is preferred signiﬁcantly more often than the Turkish
one, the H0 of equal treatment is rejected. As this test considers only observations
with diﬀerential treatment, observations of ﬁrms that either decline both applicants
or callback both applicants are irrelevant.
The ﬁrst row shows the aggregate results of the ﬁeld study. Out of the 258 ﬁrms that
accepted at least one application, 29.1% contacted only the German, and 19.0% only
the Turkish candidate, while 51.9% contacted both. This corresponds to a callback
rate of 34.7% for the Turkish student and of 39.6% for the German student. In other
words, while the German candidate has to write 15 applications to obtain 6 callbacks,
the Turkish candidate must send 17 applications for the same number of callbacks.
This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, but it is remarkably small compared to
studies on employment discrimination of ethnic minorities in other countries, such
as Albanians in Greece (Drydakis and Vlassis 2007), Arabs in Sweden (Carlsson and
Rooth 2007) or Afro–Americans in the U.S. (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004); see
Section 4 for further discussion.
Regarding the eﬀect of ﬁrm characteristics on discrimination, we note that only
four (8.9%) out of the 45 ﬁrms with less than 50 employees made an oﬀer only
to the Turkish candidate, while 12 (26.7%) preferred the German over the Turkish
6The result is the same as the χ2 of a McNemar test which considers the null hypothesis that
a dichotomous and paired outcome variable (i.e. the reaction dummies to German and Turkish
candidates) have the same distributions.
9(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)


































































































































































































































































































Notes: This table shows the distribution of the ﬁrm responses, absolute numbers are in parentheses.
Column (1) reports the fraction of ﬁrms that gave none of the candidates a callback, so the
remainder in column (2) contacted at least one applicant. Firms that gave both candidates a
positive reaction, column (3), are considered as equal treatment, while the rest preferred either
the candidate with the German or the one with the Turkish name, columns (4) and (5). Net
discrimination is calculated as (6)=(4)-(5). Column (7) contains the χ2 for equality between (4)
and (5) (H0: Turkish and German candidates are equally likely to receive a callback at any of the
paired observations). ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ signiﬁcance at the 5%-level.
Table 1: Callbacks conditional on names and ﬁrm characteristics.
10applicant. We would assume that smaller ﬁrms with fewer vacancies have a less
standardized recruitment process. This leaves more scope for individual preferences
of the human resource manager to inﬂuence hiring decisions. Indeed, discrimination
is less prominent in larger ﬁrms, presumably since their recruitment processes follow
pre–deﬁned rules.
However, diﬀerences with respect to other ﬁrm characteristics are rather limited.
We note that there are twice as many ﬁrms in East Germany7 that favour the
candidate with the German name; however, there are both too few vacancies as
well as too low callback rates to give rise to signiﬁcant results. If we consider
jobs in diﬀerent divisions, diﬀerential treatment is weakly signiﬁcant for jobs in the
marketing department. But discrimination is not particularly strong in this division;
instead there are simply many internships in marketing divisions, which implies
that only the large sample is responsible for signiﬁcant discrimination here. On the
other hand, diﬀerences in callback probabilities are remarkably strong for internships
in human resource departments, where the number of employers which favour the
German candidate is twice as large as the number of employers preferring the Turkish
one. Strong discrimination in human resource departments could be considered to
support taste–basted discrimination according to Becker (1957): managers refuse to
hire minority workers either because they do not wish to work with them personally
(due to their own discriminatory taste), or because they fear that discriminatory
tastes among co–workers or outsiders impairs productive eﬃciency in a division
with high exposures to outsiders and intense team interactions. However, there are
too few callbacks to provide statistically signiﬁcant evidence for this hypothesis.
Table 2 shows the callback rates for the diﬀerent names conditional on the resume
type. For applications of type B which include reference letters containing informa-
tion regarding the candidate’s personality, Turkish and German applicants achieve
almost identical callback rates. However, for applications of type A (without person-
ality information), the minority student receives only for 32.5% of his applications
a callback, while the German student is successful in 41.8% of his applications. The
diﬀerence in the number of callbacks between German and Turkish students of type
7“East Germany” is deﬁned as the states Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg–Western Pomera-
nia, Saxony, Saxony–Anhalt and Thuringia. “South Germany” includes the states Baden–
Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Rhineland–Palatinate, and Saarland.
11A is signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, while it is not signiﬁcant for students of type B.
We cautiously interpret this as evidence for statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973):
the diﬀerence in callbacks decreases with the provision of information about the
applicant’s character. Note however that “information” and any other type charac-
teristics are perfectly correlated. Hence the observation that callback diﬀerences are
smaller at applications of type B could, in principle, also be due to other character-
istics of a type B application. However, it is not true that type B is generally more
attractive: in contrast, German applicants of type B receive fewer callbacks than
German applicants of type A. More importantly, as we have argued above, the other
diﬀerences between type A and type B applicants are rather minor and they should
not be expected to generate the large observed diﬀerence in discrimination rates.8
It is worth to note that there is no evidence that ﬁrms from diﬀerent regions favour
a certain type, although both types come from diﬀerent regions within Germany.
callback rate type A type B
German 41.8% 37.4%
name (110 out of 263 applications) (99 out of 265 applications)
Turkish 32.5% 36.9%
name (86 out of 265 applications) (97 out of 263 applications)
Notes: Applications of type B contain two reference letters with information about the applicant’s
personality, those of type A do not.
Table 2: Callback rates for diﬀerent types.
Probit Estimation
In order to disentangle the eﬀects of diﬀerent employer and worker characteristics,
we conduct several probit estimations with the callback dummy as the dependent
variable. Table 3 summarizes the various conﬁgurations. Columns (1) to (5) show
regression outputs using the full sample. In the basic model (1) we regress the
callback only on a constant and a dummy for the Turkish name and ﬁnd a weakly
8Although the universities of both types are comparable in their academic standards within
Germany, the university of type A oﬀers a more business–oriented program which could explain why
such a candidate is a bit more attractive for most employers. Nonetheless, it is rather implausible
that this feature explains the strong diﬀerence in callback rates between ethnical types.
12signiﬁcant (at the 10 percent level) negative eﬀect of the Turkish name on the
callback probability. The interpretation of the result is that a Turkish name reduces
the probability of a callback on average by about 14%. This eﬀect is robust to
adding a dummy for the location of the ﬁrm and the workers’s type in (2), a dummy
for ﬁrms with less than 50 employees in (3) and dummies for the sector of the ﬁrm
as well as for the division of the internship in (4).9 The coeﬃcient of the dummy
for South Germany is (weakly) signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that it is easier
to ﬁnd an internship in regions with less unemployment and more job openings.
There is no evidence that one of the two application types is more successful than
the other in general. That is, the type dummy is always small and insigniﬁcant.
However, once we add an interaction term between the name (ethnicity) and the type
dummies in (5), this term catches all the disadvantage of the Turkish name, and the
coeﬃcient of the name dummy becomes small and insigniﬁcant. Again this conﬁrms
the conclusion from Table 2 that the diﬀerence in callbacks occurs predominantly at
applicants of type A where personality information is not provided. The reduction
in information seems to hurt applicants with a Turkish name. Again we cautiously
interpret this ﬁnding as evidence in support of statistical discrimination.
Other means of discrimination
Discrimination can manifest itself in several ways, not only in diﬀerent callback
rates. If a ﬁrm has no interest in any of the applicants, but the applicant with the
German name receives a polite message declining him, while an applicant with a
Turkish name is just ignored, we would consider this as discriminatory treatment,
even though it takes no direct impact on the job search outcome.
Table 4 provides a ﬁrst snapshot. The most noticeable diﬀerence in treatment of
the two applicants takes place at ﬁrms that callback one candidate and do not
respond to the second one; indeed, 28 ﬁrms showed interest in the applicant with
the German name and ignored the Turkish applicant, while only 12 ﬁrms contacted
the Turkish and ignored the German one. We would consider this as the strongest
form of discrimination: the ﬁrm has a vacant post, it shows interest in the German
9We tested several other variables but found all of them (and their interactions with the ethnicity
dummy) insigniﬁcant. This includes a “ﬁrst application” dummy, a dummy on “top employers”
(obtained from a student survey), and a dummy for employers located in a large city region.











































sector dummies yes yes
division dummies yes yes
Turk*Type A −0.27∗
(0.16)
Observations 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056
Notes: Each column represents a probit regression with the callback dummy as dependent variable.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ signiﬁcance
at the 5%-level, and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level. Several other interactions have been tested and not found
signiﬁcant.
Table 3: Probit regression with callback dummy as dependent variable.
candidate and does not even answer the Turkish one. The diﬀerence in politeness
can also be illustrated by the following comparison: 74.3% of the employers that
show no interest in the German applicant nevertheless send him a polite rejection
message, while an applicant with a Turkish name receives such a message only from
71.3% of the ﬁrms. However, this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
German / Turkish callback rejection no reaction
P
callback 134 47 28 209
rejection 37 179 21 237
no reaction 12 20 50 82
P
183 246 99 528
Table 4: Diﬀerential treatment in answers.
As another type of discrimination, we check how long applicants with diﬀerent names
have to wait for the ﬁrm’s decision, and what determines that waiting period. Most
ﬁrms react only a few workdays after we sent the application (see Table 5). A
callback is, on average, received after 11 workdays, while a rejection takes on average
17 workdays. An applicant with a Turkish name has to wait slightly longer for a
14callback (11.3 workdays with a Turkish and 10.7 workdays with a German name),
but this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. For rejections, the diﬀerence is even
smaller (17.39 workdays with a Turkish and 17.36 workdays with a German name).
There are two peculiarities, however. First, small ﬁrms react faster in general.
Second, the diﬀerence in reaction times between German and Turkish applicants is
larger at smaller ﬁrms. For example, to decline a Turkish applicant, a small ﬁrm
needs 2.3 workdays more than to decline a German applicant. We would assume
that small ﬁrms are faster in general because there is often just one decision maker,
whereas larger ﬁrms are more likely to have standardized recruitment processes
where applications have to go through many hands.
callback rejection
German name Turkish name average German name Turkish name average
small 6.1 7.0 6.5 9.9 12.2 11.0
medium 7.8 7.5 7.7 19.6 19.0 19.3
large 12.4 13.0 12.7 18.1 17.8 17.9
Table 5: Average reaction time in workdays.
We also conduct a multinomial logit with the outcomes 1 (callback), 2 (applicant
receives a rejection) versus 0 (no reaction) for every application and every workday,
beginning at the application day until the workday of the ﬁrm’s reaction. We com-
plemented the controls of the previous probit estimation by the number of workdays
that have passed without a reaction (t and t2) and by an interaction term between
t and the ﬁrm–size dummy (see Table 6). The main results of the probit estimate
can also be observed in the multinomial logit: applicants with a Turkish name are
less likely to receive a callback, and ﬁrms in South Germany are more likely to give
a positive response. In contrast, there are no such eﬀects for rejections. That is,
applications from the Turkish applicant do not receive signiﬁcantly less (or more)
rejections than candidates with a German name. Table 6 also conﬁrms that large
ﬁrms take more time to answer an application. We also checked other interaction
terms (in particular those involving the name dummy), but found all of them to be
insigniﬁcant.




































Notes: Multinomial logit with the outcomes 1: callback, 2: rejection (vs 0: no reaction at
workday t). Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%-level, ∗∗
signiﬁcance at the 5%-level, and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level. Several other interactions have been tested
and not found signiﬁcant.
Table 6: Multinomial Logit.
survival functions for our total sample. We do not show the diﬀerences between
German and Turkish candidates since they are rather tiny, especially for the callback
distribution. The ﬁgure shows that the probability to receive an answer (callback
or rejection) is signiﬁcantly declining over time and is nearly zero after about 30–
40 workdays. Before that, the probability declines about linearly for callbacks, but
non–linearly for rejections. This pattern explains why the coeﬃcient for t2 in column
2 of Table 6 is signiﬁcantly negative.
The role of the business cycle
Our ﬁeld study also permits to explore the impact of the business cycle. We con-
ducted the study in two waves, the ﬁrst one in Winter 2007/08 and the second one
in Winter 2008/09. The macroeconomic situation changed substantially between
these two dates. In particular, the accelerating ﬁnancial crisis strongly aﬀected the
real economy in late 2008. By then, most research institutes published forecasts for
16Figure 1: Response time of ﬁrms for callbacks and rejections.
Germany’s GDP growth in 2009 at -3 percent or less. Although the German labour
market remained remarkably robust during the course of 2009, we would expect that
ﬁrms adjusted their hiring behaviour in January 2009 relative to the year before.
However, the aggregate callback rates (as well as the name–speciﬁc ones) were rela-
tively stable over time (38.8% in 2007/08 versus 35.4% in 2009). It seems that two
eﬀects oﬀset each other: as global demand decreases, ﬁrms should be expected to
hire fewer workers, but they could also try to replace regular employees with cheaper
interns.
174 Conclusions
We conducted a correspondence test, sending more than a thousand applications
with randomly assigned German and Turkish names to ﬁrms advertising student
internships. The diﬀerence in callbacks is signiﬁcant but, compared to similar studies
for other countries, relatively small. Several explanations can account for this result.
First, we focus on a speciﬁc high–skill segment of the labour market. If competition
for qualiﬁed students is intense, discriminating ﬁrms cannot survive the “war for
talents” and are driven out of the market. On the other hand, in labour market seg-
ments with an excess supply of qualiﬁed workers, discrimination should be stronger
as ﬁrms can choose their favourite candidate among a large number of applicants.
Moreover, in our experiment the student with the Turkish name is a German cit-
izen with a migration background. He was born and raised in Germany, went to
school in Germany and is now studying in Germany. We focus on these second and
third generations of immigrants as they represent the largest ethnic minority in the
German labour market. The fact that all applicants are observationally equivalent
(except their name) permits us to isolate the name eﬀect from any language eﬀects.
Conducting a similar study with non–German citizens with a mother tongue other
than German should be expected to produce a larger diﬀerence in callback rates.
Both applications were endowed with very good grades and interesting enough CVs
so as to guarantee a reasonably high callback rate. It is conceivable that net dis-
crimination is substantially larger for candidates with mediocre grades; for such ap-
plications negative stereotypes of human resource managers (such as “students with
Turkish migration background are under–performing”) become potentially more im-
portant. On the other hand, the rather good grades can be inconsistent with em-
ployers’ expectations about a Turkish applicant. Hence such an observation is more
salient and takes a stronger impact on impression formation than it would do for a
German candidate (see e.g. Sherman, Stroessner, Loftus, and Deguzmani (1997)).
We would further expect that most ﬁrms with a standardized recruitment proce-
dure use a threshold strategy. Any candidate that fulﬁlls certain minimal criteria
receives a callback, and these criteria apply equally for all candidates. Since larger
ﬁrms have more often a standardized recruitment process, they also discriminate
less than smaller ﬁrms.
18This study gives only a ﬁrst insight into the extent of ethnical discrimination in Ger-
many’s labour market. There are several further questions that should be explored
in further research. First, measuring hiring discrimination in diﬀerent segments of
the labour market would provide more information on the eﬀects of sector and ﬁrm
characteristics. Second, varying the quality of the applications would also permit to
measure group–speciﬁc returns to skills, as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004).
Third, our experiment shows that provision of information about personality reduces
the extent of discrimination. In many countries it is uncommon to use references at
early stages of the recruitment process.10 Our result suggests that such conventions
can potentially backﬁre on minority employees. Future experiments, also those con-
ducted in the laboratory, should further illuminate the role of information about
personality on recruitment decisions.
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